2008 Woodie Awards
More revisionist history from the White House
Igor Volsky
Issue date: 10/14/04 Section: Opinion
- Page 1 of 2 next >
Along with the leaked CIA report, showing no ties between Saddam Hussein and the al Qaeda influenced Zarqawi, the newly-released Deulfer report, the final word on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, seems to solidify the case against an invasion. That is, the president went to war for all the wrong reasons: there were no stockpiles of weapons in Iraq, and the Hussein regime had no operational ties with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.
Hard to believe, but the administration has claimed that the Deulfer report has only strengthened the case for war. For instance, Cheney has argued the report proves that to "delay, defer, wait wasn't an option." In his comments, President Bush quoted the report as saying that Hussein "retained the knowledge, the means, and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction. And he could have passed that knowledge to our terrorist enemies."
First, while it is true that Saddam "retained the knowledge" to produce weapons of mass destruction, such information had been available (and taken advantage of by hundreds of foreign scientists) since 1946, when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published the Smyth Report. Second, Saddam did not have "the means" to produce weapons. The Deulfer report notes that after the 1991 Gulf War, "Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapon program progressively decayed ... [and there has been] no credible indication that Baghdad resumed production."
Third, the Deulfer report does claim that Saddam had "the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction." However, since Iraq was under an international sanction regime, and had no weapons capabilities, Hussein's intent could not have been acted on. And, even if the sanctions were to be lifted, the report notes that Saddam "had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions."
Bush also claims that "The Duelfer report showed that Saddam was systematically gaming the system, using the U.N. oil-for-food program to try to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions ... with the intent of restarting his weapons program once the world looked away." Yet the world did not look away.
Hard to believe, but the administration has claimed that the Deulfer report has only strengthened the case for war. For instance, Cheney has argued the report proves that to "delay, defer, wait wasn't an option." In his comments, President Bush quoted the report as saying that Hussein "retained the knowledge, the means, and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction. And he could have passed that knowledge to our terrorist enemies."
First, while it is true that Saddam "retained the knowledge" to produce weapons of mass destruction, such information had been available (and taken advantage of by hundreds of foreign scientists) since 1946, when the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published the Smyth Report. Second, Saddam did not have "the means" to produce weapons. The Deulfer report notes that after the 1991 Gulf War, "Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapon program progressively decayed ... [and there has been] no credible indication that Baghdad resumed production."
Third, the Deulfer report does claim that Saddam had "the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction." However, since Iraq was under an international sanction regime, and had no weapons capabilities, Hussein's intent could not have been acted on. And, even if the sanctions were to be lifted, the report notes that Saddam "had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions."
Bush also claims that "The Duelfer report showed that Saddam was systematically gaming the system, using the U.N. oil-for-food program to try to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions ... with the intent of restarting his weapons program once the world looked away." Yet the world did not look away.